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Abstract. Information flow properties express the capability for an
agent to infer information about secret behaviours of a partially observ-
able system. In a language-theoretic setting, where the system behaviour
is described by a language, we define the class of rational information
flow properties (RIFP), where observers are modeled by finite transduc-
ers, acting on languages in a given family L. This leads to a general
decidability criterion for the verification problem of RIFPs on L, im-
plying PSPACE-completeness for this problem on regular languages. We
show that most trace-based information flow properties studied up to
now are RIFPs, including those related to selective declassification and
conditional anonymity. As a consequence, we retrive several existing de-
cidability results that were obtained by ad-hoc proofs.
Keywords: Information flow, Security predicates, Opacity, Declassifica-
tion, Conditional anonymity, Rational transducers, Formal verification.
1 Introduction
Motivations. Generic models for information flow properties aim at expressing,
in a uniform setting, the various capabilities of observers to infer information
from partially observable systems. These models provide a description of the
system behaviour, a parametric description of the observation by the environ-
ment and the secret parts of the system, and a security criterion. A security
property is an instantiation of such a model, with the goal of avoiding a par-
ticular information flow. Generic models have been thoroughly investigated, for
instance in [Man00,FG01,BKMR08]. They propose various classifications and
comparisons of security properties, either for transition systems or directly for
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⋆⋆ supported by the NSERC Discovery Individual grant No. 13321 (Government of
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traces. In the case of transition systems [FG01,BKMR08], the branching struc-
ture permits to express security properties as equivalences like weak or strong
(bi-)simulations. For trace-based models, properties are stated as relations be-
tween languages, also called security predicates in [Man00].
In addition to classification, an important question about security proper-
ties concern their verification: given a system S and a security property P ,
does S satisfy P ? Since [FG01], much attention has been given to such ques-
tions for various classes of systems (or their sets of traces) and security prop-
erties [BKMR08,DHRS11,CDM12,DFK+12,BD12,MY14,CFK+14]. This is the
problem we consider in this work, for a subclass of trace-based information flow
properties.
Contributions. We first introduce the class of Rational Information Flow Prop-
erties (RIFP), in a language-theoretic setting. In this class, observations are
modeled by rational transducers, called here rational observers. For a language
L in some family of languages L, an RIFP is then defined as an inclusion relation
L1 ⊆ L2, where L1 and L2 are obtained from L by inductively applying rational
observers, unions and intersections. This mechanism produces the set of proper-
ties RIF (L), and a generic decidability result can be stated for the verification
problem of these properties. In the particular case of the family Reg of regular
languages, generated by finite automata (also called labelled transition systems),
we obtain a PSPACE-complete verification problem for the class RIF (Reg). We
then proceed to show that this result subsumes most existing decidability results
for security properties on regular languages, thus establishing the pertinency of
our model. This involves expressing properties in our formalism by designing
suitable rational observers. We first consider the particular case where obser-
vations are functions and we show that opacity properties with regular secrets
are RIFPs. To illustrate the expressiveness of RIFPs, we introduce a subclass
of functional rational observers that we call rational Orwellian observers and
show that several properties including intransitive non-interference and selec-
tive intransitive non-interference for a language L ∈ L are in RIF (L). We also
reduce their verification to the verification of opacity w.r.t. Orwellian observers.
These observers are more powerful than those considered so far in literature as
they model not only observers constrained to a fixed a priori interpretation of
unobservable events (static observers) or even to observers able to base this in-
terpretation on observation of previous events (dynamic observers), but also able
to re-interpret past unobservable events on the base of subsequent observation.
We finally consider general observers and we show that all Mantel’s Basic Secu-
rity Predicates (BSPs) are RIFPs. Finally, we illustrate the applicability of our
framework by providing the first formal specification for conditional anonymity
guaranteeing anonymity of agents unless revocation (for instance, the identity
of an agent discovered to be dishonest can be revealed).
Outline. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Rational Information
flow properties are defined in Section 2, with the associated decidability results.
RIFPs w.r.t. rational observation functions are investigated in Section 3: ratio-
nal opacity properties as RIFP are presented in 3.1, Orwellian observers in 3.2
and their application to intransitive non-interference and selective intransitive
non-interference in 3.3. RIFPs w.r.t. general rational observation relations are
investigated in 4: BSPs as RIFPs are presented in 4.1 and an application of gen-
eral rational observation relation to conditional anonymity is presented in 4.2.
In Section 5, we discuss related work and we conclude in Section 6.
2 Rational Information flow properties
We briefly recall the notions of finite automata and finite transducers before
defining rational information flow properties.
2.1 Automata and transducers
The set of natural numbers is denoted by N and the set of words over a finite
alphabet A is denoted by A∗, with ε for the empty word and A+ = A∗ \ {ε}.
The length of a word w is written |w| and for any a ∈ A, |w|a is the number of
occurrences of a in w. A language is a subset of A∗.
Finite Labelled Transition Systems. A finite labelled transition system (LTS or
automaton for short), over a finite set Lab of labels, is a tuple A = 〈Q, I,∆, F 〉,
where Q is a finite set of states, I ⊆ Q is the subset of initial states, ∆ ⊆
Q×Lab×Q is a finite transition relation and F ⊆ Q is a set of final states. Note
that Lab can be an alphabet but also a (subset of a) monoid.
Given two states q, q′ ∈ Q, a path from q to q′ with label u, written as q
u
−→q′,
is a sequence of transitions q
a1−→q1, q1
a2−→q2, · · · , qn−1
an−→q′, with ai ∈ Lab and
qi ∈ Q, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, such that u = a1 · · · an. The path is accepting if
q ∈ I and q′ ∈ F , and the language of A, denoted by L(A), is the set of labels
of accepting paths. A regular language over an alphabet A is a subset of A∗
accepted by a finite LTS over the set of labels A.
Finite Transducers. A finite transducer (or transducer for short) is a finite
LTS T with set of labels Lab ⊆ A∗ × B∗ for two alphabets A and B. A label
(u, v) ∈ A∗×B∗ is also written as u|v. The subset L(T ) of A∗×B∗ is a rational
relation [Sak09] from A∗ to B∗. The transducer T is said to realize the relation
L(T ) (see Fig. 1 for basic examples of transducers).
Given a rational relation R, we write R(u) = {v ∈ B∗ | (u, v) ∈ R} for the
image of u ∈ A∗, R−1(v) = {u ∈ A∗ | (u, v) ∈ R} for the inverse image of
v ∈ B∗, possibly extended to subsets of A∗ or B∗ respectively, and dom(R) =
{u ∈ A∗ | ∃v ∈ B∗, (u, v) ∈ R} for the domain of R. The relation R is complete
if dom(R) = A∗, it is a function if for each u ∈ dom(R), R(u) contains a single
element v ∈ B∗.
For a subset P of A∗, the identity relation {(u, u) | u ∈ P} on A∗ × A∗ is
denoted by IdP . The composition of rational relations R1 on A
∗ × B∗ and R2
on B∗ × C∗, denoted by R1R2 (from left to right) or by R2 ◦ R1 (from right
to left), is the rational relation on A∗ × C∗ defined by {(u,w) | ∃v (u, v) ∈
R1 ∧ (v, w) ∈ R2} ([EM65]). The family of regular languages is closed under
rational relations [Ber79].
2.2 Rational observers
Information flow properties are related to what an agent can learn from a given
system. In a language-based setting, the behavior of the system is described by
a language L over some alphabet A, and some function O associates with each
w ∈ L its observation O(w) visible by the agent. We generalize the notion of
observation by defining O as a relation on A∗×B∗ for some alphabet B, but we
restrict O to be a rational relation.
Definition 1 (Rational observer). A rational observer is a rational relation
O on A∗ × B∗, for two alphabets A and B. The observation of a word w ∈ A∗
is the set O(w) = {w′ ∈ B∗ | (w,w′) ∈ O} and for any language L ⊆ dom(O),
the observation of L is O(L) = ∪w∈LO(w).
As pointed out in [DHRS11], a large amount of information flow properties
of a language L are expressed as relations of the form op1(L) ⊆ op2(L), for some
language theoretic operations op1 and op2. Actually, we show below that op1
and op2 are often rational relations corresponding to some specific observations
of L. Also, we define the class of rational information flow properties as those
using rational observers, and positive boolean operations:
Definition 2 (Rational information flow property). A rational informa-
tion flow property (RIFP) for a language L is any relation of the form L1 ⊆ L2,
where L1 and L2 are languages given by the grammar:
L1, L2 ::= L | O(L1) | L1 ∪ L2 | L1 ∩ L2
where O is a rational observer.
Hence, from Def. 1, we recover information flow properties of L of the form
O1(L) ⊆ O2(L) for two rational observers, as a particular case. However it has to
be noted that Def. 1 does not reduce to these inclusions since rational relations
are not closed under intersection [Ber79]. Given a family of languages L, we
define RIF (L) as the set of RIFPs for languages in L. We immediately have the
following general result:
Proposition 1. Let L be a family of languages closed under union, intersection,
and rational transductions, such that the relation ⊆ is decidable in L. Then any
property in RIF (L) is decidable.
In particular, the class Reg of regular languages satisfies the conditions above,
with a PSPACE-complete inclusion problem. We then have:
Corollary 1. The problem of deciding a property in RIF (Reg) is PSPACE-
complete.
Proof. It follows from the remark above that the problem is in PSPACE. For
PSPACE-hardness, recall that for a language K, the relation OK defined by
OK(w) = {w} ∩ K is a rational observer if (and only if) K is a regular lan-
guage [Sak09]. Let L1 and L2 be two regular languages, and let OL1 , OL2 be the
two corresponding relations, then for L = A∗, we have L1 ⊆ L2 if and only if
OL1(L) ⊆ OL2(L). ⊓⊔
This corollary subsumes many existing decidability results for IF properties.
The rest of the paper is devoted to establish reductions of some of these to the
RIF (Reg) verification problem.
3 RIF properties with rational functions
In this section, we consider the generic model of opacity introduced in [BKMR08]
for transition systems. Opacity is parametrized with observation functions, that
are classified in [BKMR08] as static, dynamic or Orwellian to reflect the com-
putational power of the observer. In a static observation, actions are always
interpreted in the same way. It is defined as a morphism and hence, it is a ratio-
nal function. A particular case of static observer is the projection πB from A
∗
into B∗ for a subalphabet B of A, so that πB(a) = a if a ∈ B and πB(a) = ε
otherwise. In a dynamic observation function, interpretation of the current ac-
tion depends on the sequence of actions observed so far and hence, it is also a
rational function.
Example 1. In Fig. 1 (where all states are final states), the left hand side depicts
a transducer realizing the projection from {a, b}∗ onto {b}∗ while the right hand
side depicts a transducer realizing the following dynamic observation function
(translated from [CDM12]): The first occurrence of the first action is observed,
then nothing is observed until the first occurrence of the second action (b if the
trace begins with a and a otherwise) and everything is observed in clear as soon
as this second action occurs that is, O(aa∗bu) = abu and O(bb∗au) = bau for
any u ∈ {a, b}∗.
0
a|ε, b|b
0 1 3
2
a|a
b|b
b|ε
a|a
a|ε
b|b
a|a, b|b
Fig. 1. Examples of transducers realizing basic observation functions
In Orwellian observation functions, the current observation depends not only
on the prefix of actions observed so far but also on the complete trace. It reflects
the capability of the observer to use subsequent knowledge to re-interpret past
actions. In the rest of this section we will study opacity w.r.t. rational Orwellian
observers.
3.1 Opacity w.r.t. rational functions
In its original setting, opacity is related to a language L ⊆ A∗ modelling the
behaviour of a system, a function O from A∗ to B∗ and in addition, a predicate
ϕ given as a subset of L, describing a secret. Two words w and w′ of L are
observationally equivalent for O if O(w) = O(w′). The observation class of w in
L is the set [w]LO = {w
′ ∈ L | O(w) = O(w′)} = L ∩ O−1(O(w)).
The secret ϕ is opaque in L for O if for any word in ϕ, there is another word
in L \ ϕ such that w and w′ are observationally equivalent. Hence, ϕ is opaque
if and only if O(ϕ) ⊆ O(L \ϕ), which we take as definition when O is a rational
function:
Definition 3 (Rational Opacity). Given a language L ⊆ A∗, a language
ϕ ⊆ L and a rational function O, ϕ is rationally opaque in L for O if O(ϕ) ⊆
O(L \ ϕ).
The information flow deduced by an observer when the system is not opaque
is captured by the notion of secret disclosure: A word w ∈ L discloses the secret
S w.r.t. O if [w]LO ⊆ ϕ. We have:
Proposition 2. Rational opacity properties on languages in some family L for
regular secrets belong to RIF (L).
Proof. As already seen in the proof of Corollary 1, intersection with a regular
set K is a rational observation OK . Since the secret ϕ is regular, opacity of ϕ in
L for O is equivalent to O(Oϕ(L)) ⊆ O(O¬ϕ(L)). ⊓⊔
Non-interference and weak and strong anonymity have been shown to reduce
to opacity w.r.t. suitable observers (see [BKMR08]). In [CDM12], PSPACE-
hardness is established for opacity of regular secrets for regular languages w.r.t.
static and dynamic observers.
3.2 Rational Orwellian observers
In the sequel, we denote the disjoint union by ∪· . In our context, Orwellian ob-
servation functions from [BKMR08] are realized by rational Orwellian observers:
Definition 4 (Rational Orwellian Observer). A rational Orwellian observer
is a rational function, given as a disjoint union of functions: O = ∪· 1≤i≤nOi,
where the domains {dom(Oi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n} form a partition of A
∗. The partial
functions Oi are called views.
Note that O is a function because the domains of the views are disjoint.
We simply call these functions Orwellian observers for short, since there is no
ambiguity in our context. The terminology Orwellian comes from the ability of
the observer to somehow see in the future, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 2 (A simple example). The function O = Oa ∪· Ob ∪· Oε is an Orwellian
observer on {a, b} realized by the transducer depicted in Fig. 2. The function is
defined by O(ε) = ε and:
O(w) =
{
π{b}(w) if the last letter of w is a
π{a}(w) if the last letter of w is b.
Hence, the observer interpretation of the current event depends on the last event
of the trace. If it is a then O interprets the trace as its projection over {b} and
the other way around, if it is b then it interprets the trace as its projection over
{a}.
p0Oa : p1 q0Ob : q1 r0Oε :
a|ε
a|ε, b|b a|a, b|ε
b|ε
Fig. 2. The Orwellian observer O = Oa ∪· Ob ∪· Oε.
Despite its observational power, this observer is not able to deduce whether
the first event in the trace in L = (a + b)(a∗ + b∗)(a + b) is an a. Indeed, let
ϕ = a(a∗ + b∗)(a+ b) be the secret, corresponding to the set of traces in L with
a as the first event. Then ϕ is opaque w.r.t. O in L. To see this, if a secret trace
w is observed, examine what O can deduce from this observation.
– If w ends with an a then O(w) = bn for some n ≥ 0 but bna 6∈ ϕ is also
observed by bn.
– If w ends with a b then O(w) = an for some n ≥ 0 but banb 6∈ ϕ is also
observed by an.
Example 3 (Static and dynamic observers). Static and dynamic observations
are of course special cases of Orwellian observers, where O consists of a single
complete view. Note that static and dynamic observations preserve prefixes while
it is not necessarily the case for Orwellian observations (see examples 2 and 4).
Example 4 (Intransitive non-interference). Let A = V ∪· C ∪· D be a partition of
the alphabet into visible actions in V , confidential actions in C and declassifi-
cation actions in D. When a declassification action occurs in a word, the prefix
is observed in clear. The corresponding observation function is called in [MY14]
the projection on V unless D, and defined as a mapping πV,D : A
∗ → A∗ such
that πV,D(ǫ) = ǫ and
πV,D(ua) =


ua if a ∈ D,
πV,D(u)a if a ∈ V,
πV,D(u) otherwise.
A language L satisfies intransitive non-interference (INI) if πV,D(L) ⊆ L. Again:
Proposition 3. The function πV,D is an Orwellian observer, hence INI for lan-
guages in L belongs to RIF (L).
Proof. The function πV,D is a sum of two views: πV,D = Oε ∪· OD, realized by
the transducers depicted in Fig. 3. ⊓⊔
p0Oǫ : q0OD : q1
v|v, v ∈ V
c|ε, c ∈ C a|a, a ∈ A
v|v, v ∈ V
c|ε, c ∈ C
d|d, d ∈ D
Fig. 3. The Orwellian observer piV,D = Oǫ ∪· OD.
It has been shown in [MY14] that a language L satisfies intransitive non-
interference (INI) if and only if ϕINI = {w ∈ L | πV,D(w) 6= w} is opaque in L
w.r.t. the observer πV,D.
This can be generalized as follows, showing that many non-interference like prop-
erties reduce to opacity w.r.t. Orwellian observers.
Proposition 4. Let O be a rational idempotent function (i.e. O2 = O). Then
O(L) ⊆ L if and only if ϕO = {w ∈ L | O(w) 6= w} is opaque in L for O.
Proof. First assume that O(L) ⊆ L and let w ∈ ϕO. Then O(w) 6= w. For
w′ = O(w), we have: w′ ∈ L and O(w′) = O2(w) = O(w) = w′, hence w′ /∈ ϕO.
Opacity of ϕO follows.
Conversely, assume that ϕO is opaque and let w be an element of L. If w ∈ ϕO,
then there exists w′ ∈ L \ϕO such that O(w) = O(w
′). Since w′ /∈ ϕO, O(w
′) =
w′, hence w′ = O(w) ∈ L. Otherwise, w /∈ ϕO implies O(w) = w ∈ L. In all
cases, O(w) ∈ L and O(L) ⊆ L. ⊓⊔
Finally, we can state the following:
Proposition 5. Given an Orwellian observer O, deciding opacity of regular se-
crets w.r.t. O for regular languages is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. Corollary 1 implies that the problem is in PSPACE. For the PSPACE-
hardness, it suffices to observe that dynamic or static observers are particular
Orwellian observers for which the problem is already PSPACE-hard. ⊓⊔
In the next paragraph, we show that the observation function defined for
selective declassification is an Orwellian observer.
3.3 Selective declassification
Intransitive non-interference with selective declassification (INISD) generalizes
INI by allowing to each downgrading action to declassify only a subset of con-
fidential actions. It has recently been proposed in [BD12] for a class of Petri
net languages (that does not include rational languages). To formalize INISD,
the alphabet is partitioned into A = V ∪· C ∪· D as in example 4. In addition,
with each declassification action d ∈ D is associated a specific set C(d) ⊆ C of
confidential events, with the following meaning: An occurrence of d in a word
w declassifies all previous occurrences of actions from C(d), hence these actions
are observable while other confidential events in C are not.
Let Σ(D) = {σ ∈ D∗ | |w|d ≤ 1 for all d ∈ D} be the set of repetition-free
sequences of downgrading actions in D. With any σ = d1d2 . . . dn ∈ Σ(D), we
associate the sets:
Aσ = V ∪· C ∪· {d1, . . . , dn}
Wσ = A
∗
σ · d1 · (Aσ \ {d1})
∗ · d2 · . . . · dn · (Aσ \ {d1, . . . , dn})
∗
Vσ,i = V ∪ {dj , i+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n} ∪
n⋃
j=i+1
C(dj), for every i ∈ {0, . . . , n}
with the convention Vσ,n = V , and the projections πσ,i : A
∗ → V ∗σ,i for every
i ∈ {0, . . . , n}.
For a given σ = d1 . . . dn ∈ Σ(D), the set Wσ contains the words w in A
∗
where the set of all downgrading actions is precisely {d1, . . . , dn} and such that
the last occurrence of di precedes the last occurrence of di+1 for any 1 ≤ i ≤
n − 1. Note that the family of all these sets {Wσ, σ ∈ Σ} form a partition
of A∗. Besides, the projection πσ,i observes in clear any confidential event in
∪nj=i+1C(dj), in addition to the visible events in V and the declassifying events
from σ.
Now the property called INISD in [BD12] can be stated in our general
context for a language L as follows: For any σ ∈ Σ(D) and for any word
w = w0d1w1 . . . dnwn in L ∩ Wσ, there exists a word w
′ = w′0d1w
′
1 . . . dnw
′
n
in L ∩Wσ such that for every i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, w
′
i ∈ V
∗
σ,i and πσ,i(wi) = πσ,i(w
′
i).
We have:
Proposition 6. The INISD property for languages in L belongs to RIF (L).
Proof. We build an (idempotent) Orwellian observer OSD such that a language
L satisfies INISD if and only if OSD(L) ⊆ L. Let OSD =
⋃
· σ∈Σ(D)Oσ, where
the view Oε and a generic view Oσ for some non empty σ = d1 . . . dn ∈ Σ(D)
are depicted in Fig. 4. ⊓⊔
p0Oǫ :
v|v, v ∈ V
c|ε, c ∈ C
q0Oσ : q1
d1
· · · qn
v|v, v ∈ Vσ,0
c|ε, c ∈ Aσ \ Vσ,0
v|v, v ∈ Vσ,1
c|ε, c ∈ Aσ \ Vσ,1
v|v, v ∈ Vσ,n
c|ε, c ∈ Aσ \ Vσ,n
d2 dn
Fig. 4. Views of the observation OSD
Let w = w0d1w1 . . . dnwn be a word in L ∩Wσ, the observation of w is
Oσ(w) = πσ,0(w0)d1πσ,1(w1) . . . dnπσ,1(wn).
Then L satisfies INISD if and only if Oσ(L ∩Wσ) ⊆ L ∩Wσ for any σ ∈ Σ(D).
Since the family {Wσ, σ ∈ Σ} is a partition of A
∗, the family {L∩Wσ, σ ∈ Σ}
is a partition of L and the result follows. Each view Oσ is idempotent and
the partitionning also ensures that OSD itself is idempotent. As a consequence,
proposition 4 applies here.
Remark 1. Also note that a secret ϕ is opaque for a language L w.r.t. OSD if
and only if for all σ ∈ Σ(D), ϕ ∩Wσ is opaque for L ∩Wσ w.r.t. Oσ. Indeed,
the result again holds because the family {L ∩Wσ, σ ∈ Σ} is a partition of L:
for all σ ∈ Σ(D), Oσ(Wσ) ⊆ Wσ, we have that ϕ is opaque for L w.r.t. OSD if
and only if for all σ ∈ Σ(D),
Oσ(ϕ ∩Wσ) ⊆ Oσ((L \ ϕ) ∩Wσ) = Oσ((L ∩Wσ) \ (ϕ ∩Wσ)).
Like before, for regular languages, decidability of INISD as well as opacity
under OSD, are consequences of corollary 1 and proposition 6 above. This prop-
erty is studied in [BD12] for the prefix languages of (unbounded) labelled Petri
nets. This family is closed under intersection, inverse morphisms and alphabet-
ical morphisms, hence it is also closed under rational transductions (by Nivat’s
theorem [Ber79]), but it has an undecidable inclusion problem. A very nice proof
is given in [BD12] for the decidability of the INISD property: it relies on the de-
cidability of the inclusion problem for the particular case of free nets (where all
transitions have distinct labels, different from ε).
The following example (inspired from [BD12]) tries to explain the essence of
selective declassification.
Example 5 (The Dining Raptors). A circuit followed by a herd of goats is divided
in three sections. Each section is guarded by a gate. When gate i is open, goats
pi3
pi2Goat(i) : pi4
pi1
d3
d1
l2
d2
l3
l1
qj1
qj0Raptor(j) :
qj3
qj2
h1
d1 h2
d2
h3d3
r10
r11Gate(1) :
r20
r21
Gate(2) : r30
r31Gate(3) :
h1h3
l1, h1
h2h1
l2, h2
h3h2
l3, h3
Fig. 5. The dining Raptors
can move clockwise from section i to section i + 1 (mod 3). The center of the
circuit is occupied by a den of raptors. When gate i+1 (mod 3) is open, a raptor
can leave the den and hide around gate i after opening it and closing gate i+ 1
(mod 3) to increase chance of success. When a raptor is embushed near a section
and there is a goat in this section, the raptor can catch prey and come back to
the den.
This scenario is modelled with the transition system
DR(n,m) =
n∏
i=1
Goat(i)×
m∏
j=1
Raptor(j)×
3∏
k=1
Gate(k)
obtained by synchronizing the components depicted in Figure 5 on the comple-
mentary actions. Goats’ move from gate i to gate i+1 (mod 3) is modelled with
visible action l1, raptors’ embush action at section i, with the confidential action
hi and the raptors’ catch action in section i, by the declassification action di.
Opacity of ϕDR w.r.t. OSD in L(DR(m,n)) where
ϕDR = {u ∈ L(DR(m,n)) | OSD(u) 6= u}
comes down to absence of information the goats can get from environment about
the moment they will be caught until this happens. Hence there is no strategy
that they can oppose to the raptors. In the case where initially goats are in section
2 and gates 1 and 3 are opened, as shown in Figure 5, L(DR(n,m)) is not opaque
w.r.t. ϕDR since l3l1h2l2 reveals the secret (h2l3l1l2, l3h2l1l2 and l3l1h2l2 are the
only traces observed as l3l1l2) and this, for any number of raptors and goats.
This example may be of course modified in various ways as follows. If all three
gates are open, goat 1 never realizes she dies since l3l1h1d1 does not reveals the
secret but following this, as gate 2 is now close, goat 2 after l3l1l2 will know that
a raptor is embushed at gate 2 since l3l1h1d1l3l1h2l2 reveals the secret. If only
gate 3 is open, l3h2d2h1l1 reveals to the herd, that one of them is now trapped in
section 2. Finally, if we dismantle all three gates, the only synchronizing actions
are now the declassification ones and ϕDR becomes opaque w.r.t. OSD.
4 RIF properties with full rational relations
In this section, we first revisit Basic Security Predicates (BSP) presented in [Man00,Man01]
and used as building blocks of the Mantel’s generic security model. In the second
part, we investigate anonymity properties.
4.1 Basic Security Predicates
For BSPs, the alphabet A is partitioned into A = V ∪· C∪· N , where V is the set of
visible events, C is the set of confidential events and N is a set of internal events.
Informally, a BSP for a given language L over A, is an implication stating that
for any word w in L satisfying some restriction condition, there exists a word w′
also in L which is observationnally equivalent to w and which fulfills some closure
condition describing the way w′ is obtained from w by adding or removing some
confidential events. The conditions are sometimes parametrized by an additional
set X ⊆ A of so-called admissible events. We prove:
Proposition 7. Any BSP over languages in some family L belongs to RIF (L).
Proof. The proof mainly consists in exhibiting rational observers together with
an inclusion relation such that a language L satisfies a given BSP if and only
if this relation holds. We give the general idea with several examples. For any
B ⊆ A, we write B = A \ B. First observe that, starting from some inclusion
relation O1(L) ⊆ O2(L) for rational observers O1 and O2, ignoring events from
N reduces to composing both sides with πN . This is simply done by adding loops
labeled by n|ε, for all n ∈ N , on all states of the tranducers realizing O1 and O2
over V ∪· C. This operation corresponds to variants of the properties.
1. The simplest predicate called Strict Removal of events (SR) corresponds
to a projection: L satisfies SR if πC(L) ⊆ L. The non strict variant (R)
where events of N are ignored corresponds to πV (L) ⊆ πN (L), since the
composition of πC and πN produces πV .
2. We now turn to predicates with stepwise deletion of events. A language L
satisfies SD (Strict Deletion of events) if for any w = w1cw2 ∈ L, with c ∈ C
and πC(w2) = ε, then w1w2 ∈ L. As noted in [DHRS11], this property is
equivalent to l-del(L) ⊆ L, where l-del is the function associating with a word
w the word l-del(w) obtained from w by deleting the last confidential event.
This function is realized by the transducer in Figure 6 left. The observation
itself is described in [Man00] as a recursive operation: starting from w =
w0c1w1c2 . . . wp−1cpwp with wi ∈ C
∗
for 0 ≤ i ≤ p, the words obtained by
successively removing all confidential actions from the right to the left of w
must also belong to L. This corresponds to applying the star operation to
l-del (for the composition of relations), resulting in Odel = ∪k≥0l-del
k, which
is not a function. While the star operation does not necessarily preserve
rational relations [Sak09], in this case, Odel is realized by the transducer in
Figure 6 right.
0 1
a|a, a ∈ A
c|ε, c ∈ C
a|a, a ∈ V ∪· N
0 1
a|a, a ∈ A
c|ε, c ∈ C
a|a, a ∈ V ∪· N
c|ε, c ∈ C
Fig. 6. Transducers for Strict Deletion l-del (left) and observation Odel (right)
Again the non strict variant (D) is obtained by composition on both sides
with πN . An other variant, Backward Strict Deletion of confidential events
(BSD), is defined by: L satisfies BSD if for any w = w1cw2 ∈ L with
πC(w2) = ε, there is w
′
2 such that πN (w2) = πN (w
′
2) and w1w
′
2 ∈ L. In
this case, only the suffixes w2 and w
′
2 following the last confidential event
can differ on internal events from N . The corresponding observation relation
OBSD is defined by associating with a word w = w1cw2 such that πC(w2) =
ε, all words obtained from w by removing c and replacing w2 by some w
′
2
such that πN (w2) = πN (w
′
2). Then, the rational observation OBSD realized
by the transducer in Fig. 7 left (which is not a function) is such that L
satisfies BSD if and only if OBSD(L) ⊆ L.
0 1
a|a, a ∈ A
c|ε, c ∈ C
v|v, v ∈ V
n|ε, ε|n, n ∈ N
0 1 2
a|a, a ∈ A
c|ε, c ∈ C′
ε|n, n ∈ N ′
v|v, v ∈ V ′
ε|n, n|ε n ∈ N
v|v, v ∈ V
Fig. 7. Transducers for BSD (left) and FCD (right)
A last variant, called Forward Correctable Deletion (FCD) in [DHRS11] con-
siders fixed subsets V ′ ⊆ V , C′ ⊆ C and N ′ ⊆ N . A language L satisfies
FCD if for any w = w1cvw2 in L with c ∈ C
′, v ∈ V ′ and πC(w2) = ε, there
are some w′ ∈ N ′∗ and w′2 such that πN (w2) = πN (w
′
2) and w1w
′vw′2 ∈ L.
The corresponding transducer OFCD is depicted in Fig. 7 right, with L sat-
isfies FCD if and only if OFCD(L) ⊆ L.
3. Finally, the last class concerns stepwise insertion of events. A language L
satisfies SI (Strict insertion of events) if for any w = w1w2 ∈ L, with
πC(w2) = ε, and for any c ∈ C, we have w1cw2 ∈ L. The correspond-
ing relation l-ins (which is also not a function) such that L satisfies SI iff
l-ins(L) ⊆ L, is realized by a transducer similar to the one in Fig. 6 left,
where the middle labels c|ε, c ∈ C are replaced by ε|c, c ∈ C. The non strict
(I), the backward (BSI) and the correctable (FCI) variants are obtained
similarly.
The remaining four predicates concern insertion with respect to admissible
events. For a given subset X of A, a language L satisfies Strict insertion of
X-admissible events (SIAX) if for any w = w1w2 ∈ L such that πC(w2) = ε
and there are some w3 ∈ A
∗ and c ∈ C with w3c ∈ L and πX(w1) =
πX(w3), we have w1cw2 ∈ L. In this case, recall that the left quotient of
language M ′ by language M is defined by M−1M ′ = {w1 ∈ A
∗ | w1w2 ∈
M ′ for some w2 ∈ M}. For a fixed regular language M , the left quotient
by M and the concatenation by M are rational relations [Ber79]. For each
c ∈ C, we consider the two following rational relations:
– l-insc is the variant of l-ins where the single fixed letter c is inserted,
– OXc is defined by O
X
c (u) = π
−1
X (πX(c
−1u)).c.(V ∪· N)∗ for u ∈ A∗.
Then L satisfies SIAX if and only
⋃
c∈C(l-insc(L) ∩ O
X
c (L)) ⊆ L.
Similar relations hold for the variants (IAX), (BSIAX) and (FCIAX),
hence these four cases are slightly different from the previous ones.
⊓⊔
In [DHRS11], the decidability results for all 14 BSPs on regular languages are
obtained by ad-hoc proofs establishing that regularity is preserved by the various
op1, op2 operations. These include auxiliary functions on languages (like mark,
unmark, etc.) that are unnecessary in our setting. Actually, we show how de-
cidability of BSPs is an immediate consequence of corollary 1 and proposition 7
above. The more difficult case of pushdown systems (generating prefix-closed
context-free languages) is also investigated in [DHRS11]: Although context-
free languages are closed under rational transductions, they are not closed un-
der intersection and the inclusion problem is undecidable for context-free lan-
guages [Ber79]. Finally, several undecidability results are presented in [DHRS11].
In particular, they exhibit an information flow property called Weak Non Infer-
ence (WNI) shown to be undecidable even for regular languages. Hence, WNI
cannot be expressed neither as a conjunction of BSPs, and as matter of fact,
neither as an RIFP. Also, in order to get decidable cases, authors had to restrict
the languages and/or the class of properties like reducing the size of the alphabet
(card(V ) ≤ 1 and card(C) ≤ 1).
4.2 Conditional anonymity
Conditional or escrowed anonymity is concerned with the revocation of the
guarantee, under well-defined conditions, to which an agent agrees, that his
identification w.r.t. a particular (non-secret) action will remain secret and in
such case, conditional anonymity guarantees the unlinkability of revoked users
in order to guarantee anonymity to “legitimate” agents [DS08]. As suggested
in [BKMR08], Orwellian observation can be used to model conditional anonymity
but [BKMR08] contains neither a definition of such a property, nor any investi-
gation of its decidability. We close the gap in this paper.
The alphabet is partitioned into A = V ∪· P ∪· R where P is the set of actions
performed by anonymous participants, V is the set of visible actions and R is the
set of anonymity revocation actions, such that for each participant corresponds
a dedicated revocation action r allowing to reveal the subset P (r) of all its
anonymous actions. Hence the sets P (r) are mutually disjoint.
In [SS96], definitions of weak and strong anonymity are given in the setting
of the process algebra CSP. A language is strongly anonymous (SA) if it is stable
under any “perturbation” of anonymous actions where an anonymous action in
P can be replaced by any other element of P . It is weakly anonymous (WA) if
it is stable under any permutation on the set of anonymous actions. For a finite
set Z, we denote by SZ the set of all permutations on Z. We first have:
Proposition 8. Weak and strong anonymity on languages in L belong to RIF (L).
Proof. For these two properties, the subalphabet R of revocation actions is
empty. We express the properties in our language-based setting, similarly as
in [BKMR08].
A language L is strongly anonymous w.r.t. P if OPSA(L) ⊆ L where O
P
SA is
the mapping defined on A = V ∪· P by: OPSA(a) = P if a ∈ P and O
P
SA(a) =
{a} otherwise. Such mappings (called rational substitutions in [Ber79]) are well
known to be rational relations, hence the result follows.
A language L is weakly anonymous w.r.t. P if OPWA(L) ⊆ L where O
P
WA =⋃
· α∈SP Oα and Oα is the morphism which applies the permutation α on letters
of P :
Oα(a) = α(a) if a ∈ P and Oα(a) = a otherwise.
With any σ ⊆ R, we associate:
– Wσ = {w ∈ A
∗ | πR(w) ∈ σ
∗}, the set of words w in A∗ where the set of
revocation actions appearing in w is σ,
– Pσ = P \
⋃
· r∈σ P (r), the set of actions of legitimate agents.
We denote by 2R the powerset of R and remark that here also, the sets Wσ
for σ ∈ 2R form a partition of A∗. In order to provide at any moment strong
(weak) anonymization to legitimate agents, we define conditional anonymity as
follows:
Definition 5. With the notations above, a language L on V ∪· P ∪· R is:
– conditionally weakly anonymous (CWA) if for any σ ⊆ R, L ∩Wσ is WA
w.r.t. Pσ,
– conditionally strongly anonymous (CSA) if for any σ ⊆ R, L ∩Wσ is SA
w.r.t. Pσ.
Now we have:
Proposition 9. Weak and strong conditional anonymity on languages in L be-
long to RIF (L).
Proof. We build rational observers, with a view-like component for each possible
subset σ of revoked users, corresponding to OSA (resp. OWA) localized to Wσ,
i.e. revocation actions are those in σ, anonymous actions are restricted to Pσ
and visible actions are extended to V ∪·
⋃
· r∈σ P (r):
OCSA =
⋃
·
σ∈2R
OPσSA and OCWA =
⋃
·
σ∈2R
OPσWA
Then L is conditionally strongly anonymous (CSA) if and only if OCSA(L) ⊆
L and L is conditionally weakly anonymous (CWA) if and only if OCWA(L) ⊆ L,
which yields the result. ⊓⊔
5 Related works.
Along the lines, important connections between RIFPs and information flow
properties have been established, hence in this section, we will focus on extending
the picture.
Algorithms for verifying opacity in Discrete Event Systems w.r.t. projec-
tions are presented together with applications in [BBB+07,TK09,SH11,Lin11].
In [BBB+07], the authors consider a concurrent version of opacity and show that
it is decidable for regular systems and secrets. In [TK09], the authors define what
they called secrecy and provide algorithms for verifying this property. A sys-
tem property satisfies secrecy if the property and its negation are state-based
opaque. In [Lin11] the author provides an algorithm for verifying state-based
opacity (called strong opacity) and shows how opacity can be instantiated to
important security properties in computer systems and communication proto-
cols, namely anonymity and secrecy. In [SH11], the authors define the notion of
K-step opacity where the system remains state-based opaque in any step up to
depth-k observations that is, any observation disclosing the secret has a length
greater than k. Two methods are proposed for verifying K-step opacity. All these
verification problems can be uniformly reduced to the RIFP verification problem.
In [FG01], the authors provide decision procedures for a large class of trace-
based security properties that can all be reduced to the RIFP verification prob-
lem for regular languages. In [MZ07], decision procedures are given for trace-
based properties like non-deducibility, generalized non-interference and forward
correctability. The PSPACE-completeness results for these procedures can be
reduced to our results.
Concerning intransitive information flow (IIF), non-interference (NI) and
intransitive non-interference (INI) for deterministic Mealy machines have been
defined in [Rus92]. In [Pin95], an algorithm is provided for INI. A formulation
of INI in the context of non-deterministic LTSs is given in [Mul00], in the form
of a property called admissible interference (AI), which is verified by reduction
to a stronger version of NI. This property, called strong non-deterministic non-
interference (SNNI) in [FG01], is applied to N finite transition systems where N
is the number of downgrading transitions of the original system. This problem
was also reduced to the opacity verification problem w.r.t. Orwellian projections
in [MY14]. In [BPR04], various notions of trace-based INI declassification prop-
erties are considered and compared. In contrast, our generic model is instantiable
to a much larger class of IIF properties.
In [vdM07], the author has argued that Rushby’s definition of security for
intransitive policies suffers from some flaw, and proposed some stronger varia-
tions. The considered flaw relies to the fact that, if u ∈ Wd1 and v ∈Wd2 , that is
u (resp. v) declassifies only h1 ∈ H(d1) (resp. h2 ∈ H(d2)), then the shuffle of u
and v resulting of their concurrent interaction will reveal the order in which h1
and h2 have been executed. The proof techniques used in this paper for deciding
the RIFP verification problem relies on their end-to-end execution semantics and
hence does not address this problem.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a language-theoretic model for trace-based in-
formation flow properties, the RIFPs where observers are modelled by rational
transducers. Given a family L of languages, our model provides a generic decid-
ability result to the RIF (L) verification problem: Given L ∈ L and a security
property P in RIF(L), does L satisfy P? When L is the class Reg of regular
languages, the problem is shown PSPACE-complete. This result subsumes most
decidability results for finite systems. In order to prove that, we have shown that
opacity properties and Mantel’s BSPs, two major generic models for trace-based
IF properties, are RIFPs. We have illustrated the expressiveness of our model
by showing that the verification problem of INI and INISD can be reduced to
the verification problem of opacity w.r.t. a subclass of rational observers called
rational Orwellian observers. Finally we have illustrated the applicability of our
framework by providing the first formal specification of conditional anonymity.
As far as we know, the only decidability results of trace-based security prop-
erties for infinite systems are presented in [BDG11,BD12,DHRS11]. Hence, the
approaches of the present paper and [BD12,DHRS11] lead to the question (which
is so far open, to the best of our knowledge) of which infinite systems have a de-
cidable verification problem for BSPs. Another line for future work would be to
investigate the links between our framework and the logics studied in [DFK+12]
and [CFK+14].
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